Legal and political sciences scholars have spent much ink describing and explaining how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) promoted its own idea of Europe (supranational, federal, centralised, unitary, and driven by law). However, since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), European integration has evolved in a way which challenges the Court’s ideal. These developments are captured under the analytical label of 'new intergovernmentalism' (Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter, New intergovernmentalism, OUP, forthcoming). This paper examines the Court’s contribution and reaction to 'new intergovernmentalism' in Europe through an analysis of relevant judicial developments to find out whether the Court’s is still pursuing the same European ideal, how it approaches new decision-making bodies and integration processes, and whether it supports intergovernmental consensus. Preliminary conclusions point to a court engaged in a difficult mutation process, as it attempts to transform from an agent of integration into a proper constitutional court operating within complex, flexible and changing institutional environments.