One of the primary functions of a state is to provide security. In the past, the concept of security was primarily associated with the protection of the regime within a given territory. However, today the notion of security has evolved to encompass a multitude of complex and often conflicting factors. Security is no longer solely defined by territory protection; it also has expanded to encompass the capacity for sustainable development and resilience. It is widely acknowledged that countries with democratic regimes possess a distinct advantage in this regard. However, it is often more intuitive to examine the quirks of rogue states, where seemingly illogical solutions often find, or at least seek, their logical explanation. And what if we add the Anthropocene to the equation and observe the failed transition from paleomodernity to gaiamodernity, as authroritarians tend to prioritize the security of their regimes rather than the security of their people or the environment.
Democratic versus authoritarian states
It is often, if not always, the case that democracies and authoritarian regimes, broadly understood, espouse different philosophies of governance. To paraphrase the famous soliloquy from Shakespeare's Hamlet, "To serve or be served." In the ideal scenario, a democracy is characterised by the accountability of those in power to the sovereign, that is to say, the people who have given them that power. Irresponsibility, mistakes and incompetence are punished. An authoritarian leader would be open to this proposition, provided that the accountability in question is subject to the oversight of an impartial arbiter who is presumed to always make the correct decision – him. It is a common to hear the following phrases after a crisis (just watch Russian Federal TV for a while): "All those who are guilty will receive their just punishments," "The authorities will undoubtedly find the optimal solution," and "The competent authorities are working tirelessly on this issue."
In authoritarian regimes, particularly those that have become entrenched, the prevailing pattern of system operation tends to become increasingly inert. Consequently, the primary objective is not to anticipate or prevent problems, but rather to ensure that, when they do arise, your own department or ministry is not held accountable for them. From the perspective of a long-serving civil servant with a satisfactory salary, career prospects and the appropriate loyalties, this strategy is not fundamentally wrong. However, from the perspective of the state, civil society, and the general public, this can be highly detrimental and lead to the decline of trust. As Alexander Etkind observes in his latest book “Russia against modernity”, these states turn into parasitic ones, failing to fulfil their basic functions, while maintaining external attributes of a real state.
And here it is necessary to consider the Anthropocene in this context - it is evident that the influence of nature is significant in determining the potential for sustainable development of a society, and thus its safety. The attitude of those in power towards this area, and in particular their specific actions (or inactions), is indicative of their strategy for building for society or irresponsibly using resources to their advantage at the expense of both the present and the future. This is the logic behind the paleomodernity era - the more resources were used and the more energy consumed, the higher was a civilization. This era must end, otherwise the worlds as we know it will. Authoritarian states may actually recognise the issue and take measures, but if it comes to the worst. Imperialist once, on the other hand, can’t go against their nature, even if it means going against the whole nature.
Green Russia?
In this context, Russia represents a particularly illustrative case. Petrostate, stuck in the paleomodernity, whose vertical power remains as formidable as ever, regardless of the regime in place. A country where, if there are any problems, they are under the influence of external factors, although it is repeatedly asserted that no one can influence the all-powerful sovereign power amassed in Moscow. A country, that refuses to acknowledge the new realities in order to maintain its corrupted power system. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Russia, like any other country, is not exempt from the impact of either climatic disasters or catastrophes caused by human carelessness. However, Russia is more susceptible to such challenges than other countries precisely because of the nature of its system. The reluctance to accept accountability for mistakes and failures hinders the possibility of implementing reforms. This leads to, as suggested by Alexander Etkind, the concept of “stopmodernism”. The issue is not with the actions of specific leaders or officials, but rather with the manner in which the entire Leviathan operates.
With regard to the question of the Anthropocene, it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which a rational individual would oppose the prudent utilisation of their country's natural resources and their preservation for future generations. Russia is no exception. As sociologist Grigory Yudin notes, there is one issue that can unite all Russians, regardless of their stance on the war in Ukraine: the need to protect the environment. The question, however, remains as to who will be the courageous individual to tell the population, many of whom rely on social benefits and privileges to survive, that the necessity for a complete transformation in the utilisation of energy resources, in particular, necessitates a significant reduction in direct and indirect state assistance. The question is how easily businesses and entire industries can be shut down while not destroying the sustainable future of children without depriving their parents of the present. It is unclear who will assume responsibility for the decades of ineffective management and the increase in near feudal dependency of some enterprise such as Lukoil Perm (see “The Depths of Russia” by Douglas Rogers) when the dependencies on the quick fixes offered by the carbon industries are lightened.
When it happens
This is not merely an exercise in abstract reasoning; it is a reflection of reality. One might cite the Chornobyl disaster as an example of the Soviet authorities' reluctance to seek assistance. This was because the Soviet system was perceived to be inefficient, and thus any admission of weakness would have been seen as a vulnerability to the enemy. This silence did not prevent the collapse of the system, but it did have a profound impact on the lives of tens of thousands.
Dalur's uranium emissions, Black snow in Kuzbass, Tons of Severstal's waste, Smouldering quarry in Sibai, Dam break in Yakutia, and recently the flooding in Omsk are just a few of the cases. While the federal TV channels proudly explain how Russian oil has 'broken through the Western sanctions blockade', they forget to mention that the country ranks first in the world in the number of oil spills and that oil accidents in Russia happen every half hour. This is largely because state-owned oil companies find it easier to compensate for the damage than to invest in new and better infrastructure and production. With the depletion of reserves accumulated over the years, again thanks to the indiscriminate sale of natural resources, and the attempted financial balance to sustain the war in Ukraine and pacify the population with a relatively broad social policy, it is logical to assume a deterioration of the environmental situation in Russia, and with it an overall deterioration in living standards and economic prospects. This is the biggest security threat for Russia, not NATO.
Going international
It is paradoxical that the inability to resolve internal issues prevents them from seeking to distinguish themselves in the international community. This is reminiscent of Ivan Krаstev's concept of imitation democracy, whereby the external appearance of democracy is maintained, but the internal functioning of the system is not (see The Light that Failed: A Reckoning by Ivan Krastev). A comparable approach can be observed in Russia's endeavours to assume a leading role in the emerging "new climate order". Despite the country's current diplomatic challenges, a number of nations, including within the BRICS, have not yet entirely relinquished their engagement with Moscow. Despite its ongoing conflict with the West, Russia acknowledges the necessity of adapting to the new climate realities and the value of collective action to address them. However, this is largely a matter of rhetoric, not action. In the context of its BRICS presidency in 2024, Russia has expressed a desire for a new non-Western approach to socio-economic sustainability, cooperation on green innovation and low-carbon development, environmental protection and minimising the human impact on the planet's climate. However the actions of the Russian government show that it has no intention of giving up its carbon resources or implementing a long-term strategy for sustainable development, which in actuality lies at the heart of the green transition. In fact, the regime is engaged in ithe continued rresponsible exploitation of natural resources in order to maintain its grip on power.
Such concepts are not novel. For several years, there has been discussion about the significant potential that the country (and its BRICS counterparts) has in this field. Furthermore, until the war, the green idea was regarded as a "window" to the wider world, and this perception served to construct the narrative that the country could potentially become one of the most influential agents of change in this area.These aspirations appear to remain at least partially intact. The objective is to reclaim the country's standing on the inteernational stage, thereby expanding its influence not only in global diplomacy but also in a number of regions affected by the crisis, including Africa, Asia, and South America. While this may initially appear to be as promising, it is important to consider the actualities of the situation. Firstly one must consider Russia's role as the aggressor in several military conflicts against its neighbors, which severley limits its capacity for change. Secondly, the BRICS alliance for example is not a unified bloc, which further constrains its ability to garner international support, and often these countries are competitors with one another. Their perpetual unwillingness to address their own domestic issues stemms from their refusal to acknowledge the long-standing failures of their flawed policies (and this is impossible for such regimes). In this context, the Russian regime is compelled to maintain its current position, whether through military conflict or the dissemination of propaganda. The transition from a petrostate to a sustainable democracy is not only challenging but appears to be an unlikely prospect for Russia in its current state.
Final remarks
It appears that over the past few decades, the discourse surrounding the conflict between democratic and authoritarian regimes has emerged as a dominant theme, with a considerable number of individuals espousing the view that the forces of good will inevitably prevail. The focus of discourse is now shifting towards climate change and the necessity for collective action. This shift is accompanied by a renewed sense of optimism among politicians. However, empirical evidence indicates that both predictions are far from accurate. It is evident that the two phenomena cannot be considered in isolation. The capacity to be held to account is not a universal attribute of all regimes. This is a crucial factor in facilitating the much-needed change in the era of gaiamodernity.
Painting by Isaak Levitan "Over Eternal Peace"
Image source: Book cover, Picture 1
Article by Stefan Stoyanov